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Abstract
We combine two empirical observations in a general equilibrium occupational choice
model. The ￿rst is that entrepreneurs have more control than employees over the employ-
ment of and accruals from assets, such as human capital. The second observation is that
entrepreneurs enjoy higher returns to human capital than employees. We present an intuitive
model showing that more control (observation 1) may be an explanation for higher returns
(observation 2); its main outcome is that returns to ability are higher in higher control en-
vironments. This provides a theoretical underpinning for the control-based explanation for
higher returns to human capital for entrepreneurs.
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11 Introduction
Entrepreneurs are more satis￿ed with their work than employees, even though they work longer
hours and obtain lower and more variable rewards (Blanch￿ ower and Oswald, 1998; Hamilton,
2000; Van Praag and Versloot, 2007). This remarkable di⁄erence is explained empirically by more
autonomy and control over (the accruals from) one￿ s own work as an entrepreneur compared to
positions in wage employment (Benz and Frey, 2008). Control over one￿ s work thus seems like
an important distinguishing feature of entrepreneurship.
The aspect of control that we study in this article is control over the employment of and
accruals from assets in the form of human capital. We do not consider the control-satisfaction
relationship, but, instead, the relationship between control and the pecuniary returns to human
capital. Empirical evidence indeed support the contention that entrepreneurs enjoy a higher
return to their human capital (Van der Sluis et al., 2005; Parker and Van Praag; 2006; Hartog
et al., 2008). Is more control over the employment of and accruals from human capital a likely
explanation for this empirical observation?
The control explanation has a clear intuition. Entrepreneurs, de￿ned as the business owning
managers of their ￿rms can better form and control the environment in which they operate than
wage employees. They can adapt their production processes in a way that yields the highest
return to their assets. One of these assets is their own human capital. Moreover, as a residual
claimant of the ￿rm, the bene￿ts of the pro￿table use of their human capital accrue fully to the
entrepreneur. Employees, on the other hand, are constrained by the organizational and wage
structure surrounding them. Organizations cannot adapt their organizational and wage structure
to every individual, i.e. both the jobs and the wages that individuals are matched to are not
uniquely tailored. As a consequence, the proceeds from their human capital are not mapped on
a one-to-one basis to the employees￿earnings.
In this article we incorporate the notion of control in a general equilibrium occupational choice
model. The main robust equilibrium property is that workers￿returns to ability are higher when
they work in an environment where they have more control. Therefore, our model provides a
theoretical underpinning for the control-based explanation of the empirical observation that the
returns to ability and education are higher for entrepreneurs than for employees. Moreover, some
2implications are derived in terms of the social allocation of human capital and the distribution
of income in general equilibrium.
The notion of control is explicitly incorporated in the model as follows. Workers are employed
by ￿rms that utilize an exogenously determined number of wage brackets. Individual employees
are assigned to particular functional levels based on their actual ability levels. Each functional
level is attached to a wage bracket which is based on the average ability level of the workers in
that functional level. Di⁄erential levels of control are modelled by varying the number of wage
brackets. With just one wage bracket, an employee￿ s remuneration level (and more implicitly,
her tasks) does not depend on her ability and there is no control as how to employ or create
value from human capital (ability in this case). When the number of brackets is increased, the
sorting of employees over wage brackets is more accurately tied to their ability level. Hence, the
correspondence between individual ability and remuneration increases in the number of brackets.
Another property of our model is that individuals with a high skill level as compared to
their peers within their functional level are most likely to become entrepreneurs. In each bracket
individuals are paid a wage corresponding to the mean skill level. Individuals with an ability
level above the mean are consequently undercompensated. The opportunity cost of becoming an
entrepreneur is hence determined in relation to the relevant wage bracket.1 Thus, we will ￿nd
entrepreneurs not only among the highest skilled, which would be the case with one wage bracket,
but among those who are highly skilled relative to the mean ability within their bracket. This
is consistent with the empirical observation that the division of the workforce over employees
and entrepreneurs is not determined by ability levels (that are possibly generated by schooling).2
Exactly this observation is what Lazear (2005) sought to explain with his jacks-of-all-trades
hypothesis. Our model, which assumes that the entrepreneur can better command his abilities,
yields the same prediction.
The main question that the model answers is how control, i.e., the number of wage brackets,
a⁄ects the returns to ability. Given that more brackets increase the correspondence between
ability and remuneration, the answer to this question might seem obvious. However, as Figures
1In support of this, Andersson and Wadensj￿ (2006) establish evidence that people whose expected earnings ￿
based on their observed characteristics including education and experience ￿in wage employment are higher than
their actual earnings in wage employment are more inclined to become entrepreneurs.
2See for instance Van der Sluis et al. (2008), Hartog et al. (2008) and Van der Sluis et al. (2005).
31a,b in Section 3 will demonstrate, the relationship between control (as indicated by the number
of wage brackets) and returns to ability may be positive, negative or zero.
General equilibrium occupational choice models in the tradition of Lucas, (1978) and Kanbur
(1979) have implicitly assumed a higher degree of control for entrepreneurs than for employees
by assuming a uniform wage level for employees and entrepreneurial pro￿ts dependent on the
entrepreneur￿ s ability. General equilibriums where the di⁄erence in control between entrepreneurs
and employees is extremely high are hence well-explored; although the interpretation in terms of
control has not yet been made. Much less is known about general equilibrium properties when the
level of control varies. This article creates a better understanding of the general equilibrium e⁄ect
of a di⁄erential level of control. Another contribution of this article is to show the possibility of
￿nding an equilibrium in a general equilibrium setting which incorporates a control mechanism.
The equilibrium is consistent with the robust empirical ￿nding that ability plays an important
role in shaping occupational choice decisions (between entrepreneurship and wage employment),
in combination with higher returns to ability for entrepreneurs than for employees.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview
of the empirical results so far on the returns to human capital for entrepreneurs relative to
employees. In Section 3 we discuss the model and in Section 4 its equilibrium properties. Section
5 concludes.
2 Returns to human capital for entrepreneurs versus em-
ployees
We shall now review the evidence with regard to returns to ability according to three indicators of
ability: education, intelligence and balanced skills sets. Recent studies that measure the returns
to education for entrepreneurs and compare them to those of employees ￿and acknowledges the
endogenous nature of education to income ￿include Van Der Sluis et al. (2005) and Van Der Sluis
and Van Praag (2007). The ￿rst study estimates income equations for a combined representative
panel sample of entrepreneurs and employees from the U.S. population (NLSY). An instrumental
variable approach is used to take into account that education is endogenous. Family background
4variables are used as instruments. Returns to education are found to be signi￿cantly higher for
entrepreneurs than for employees. The result is robust to a speci￿cation with individual ￿xed
e⁄ects and identi￿cation on switchers between employment and entrepreneurship.
Van der Sluis and van Praag (2007) use the variation over time and geographical regions
(states) in compulsory schooling laws in the US as the identifying instrument for education,
similar to Oreopoulos (2006). They extend the application by Oreopoulos by distinguishing
entrepreneurs from employees. The dataset is taken from the US Census for each decade from
1950 until 2000. Again, the results show that the returns to education are substantially higher for
entrepreneurs than for employees and that the result is robust to several possible measurement
problems.
The two studies discussed pertain to the United States. Comparable studies for Europe have
not yet been performed. However, Parker and Van Praag (2006) show, using a method similar
to Van Der Sluis et al. (2005), but based on a Dutch sample of entrepreneurs only, that the
return to education for entrepreneurs in the Netherlands is high, and, actually, higher than the
returns to education for Dutch wage employees as measured using a similar method by Plug and
Levin (1999). Moreover, a recent descriptive study of the education backgrounds of the 200 top
entrepreneurs in the Netherlands shows that more than 60 percent of them have an academic
background. This proportion is ￿ve times as high as it is for the general working population in
the Netherlands in 2005 (CBS, 2007) and may therefore be indicative of substantial returns to
education for entrepreneurs.
A second indicator of ability is intelligence. Hartog et al. (2008) is the only study to our
knowledge which estimates income equations for entrepreneurs and employees in order to quantify
the returns to (various kinds of) intelligence and ability for entrepreneurs relative to employees.
Based on a representative panel of individuals in the United States (NLSY), Hartog et al. (2008)
￿nd that the returns to general intelligence (using the ASVAB [Armed Service Vocational Apti-
tude Battery] scores measured at a young age) are higher for entrepreneurs than for employees.
The returns to general ability are estimated to be higher for entrepreneurs than for employees in
both random-e⁄ects and ￿xed-e⁄ects frameworks, where the latter controls for unobserved time-
invariant individual characteristics. This suggests that it is really occupational returns rather
than personal characteristics which underpin the ￿ndings.
5The third measure of ability that has been studied in the literature is the balance between
various dimensions of abilities. A recent series of articles, initiated by Lazear (2005) and further
built on by Wagner (2003), Silva (2007) and Hartog et al. (2008) pays attention to the combi-
nation of di⁄erent competencies instead of merely their level. People with balanced scores on
various measures of skill are so-called Jacks-of-all-Trades (JAT) (Lazear, 2005). These studies
￿nd unambiguous evidence for higher marginal returns to a balanced set of skills for entrepreneurs
than for employees.
Another relevant ￿nding in Van der Sluis et al. (2005) is that people who have a high per-
ceived control over the environment, measured by locus of control (Rotter, 1966), also have higher
return to education. If locus of control is used as a proxy for actual control, those entrepreneurs
and employees who have the perception that they are in control of their environment should
experience, on average, higher returns to education .3 Besides the control explanation, two alter-
native theoretical mechanisms that are consistent with this empirical evidence can be identi￿ed.4
First, higher educated individuals have better outside opportunities. Hence, they are likely to
venture into projects with a higher expected return. If such projects are at the same time more
risky they may require an additional pro￿t margin as a risk premium, which could cause the
observed e⁄ect of di⁄erential returns to education. Van Der Sluis et al. (2005) test and reject
this hypothesis. Their ￿ndings indicate that entrepreneurs are indeed exposed to more income
risk than employees, but that the di⁄erence is a decreasing rather than an increasing function of
education. Thus, they conclude that the higher returns to education or ability for entrepreneurs
are not a kind of risk premium.
The second explanation is related to signalling theory. The classic notion has long been that
education can only be used as a signal of superior productivity by employees, not by entrepre-
neurs, as the only stakeholders towards whom signals can be valuable are (prospective) employers
(Weiss, 1995). However, as recent works indicate and support empirically, entrepreneurs may
use their education as a signal towards suppliers of capital (Parker and Van Praag, 2006), or
towards customers and highly quali￿ed employees (Backes-Gellner and Werner, 2007). This may
3Individuals with an external locus-of-control personality tend to perceive an event as beyond their control,
and attribute the outcomes of the event to chance, luck, as under control of powerful others, or as unpredictable.
4Various alternative explanations related to measurement issues have been put forth, tested and rejected by
Van Der Sluis et al. (2005).
6provide an explanation for higher returns to education for entrepreneurs than for employees, but
not why the return to cognitive abilities as such is higher.
3 The Model
Preliminaries
We consider a standard occupational choice model. Individuals who are only heterogeneous
with respect to general ability make a choice whether to become an entrepreneur or a wage
employee.5 An individual￿ s ability level a⁄ects the relative return to entrepreneurship and em-
ployment, and thereby determines the entry decision. Human capital, i.e., general ability enters
into the entrepreneur￿ s production function as the only input.
The model is amended in a simple way by assuming that ￿rms use multiple discrete wage
levels. The common assumption in this class of models has been that either there is only one
wage level (e.g. Kanbur (1979) and Lucas (1978)) or individual wages are a continuous function
of individual characteristics such as ability, experience and education, as in the classic Mincerian
approach (1974). Both of these assumptions are arguably at odds with reality. There are nu-
merous circumstances that prevent the employer from perfectly tailor jobs to each individual￿ s
unique characteristics. At the ￿rm level, such tailor made procedures would arguably be pro-
hibitively costly and also clash with other organizational goals. Other obstacles pertain to labor
market rigidities such as collective wage bargaining and employment protection which increases
the cost of ￿ exibility in job assignment.
By imposing discrete wage levels we position ourselves somewhere in between these two
extremes and add to the realism of the model. The implicit assumption is that employers are
unable to perfectly discriminate between the ability levels of wage workers. Moreover we assume
a situation where all brackets are of equal size. The distribution of ability used is generated from
an underlying distribution of talent and a production function. This allows us to make some
interpretations in terms of educational institutions represented as features of the production
function.
5This is in contrast to Lucas (1978) and Kanbur (1979) who both assumed that agents were heterogeneous in
managerial ability ￿used as an entrepreneur ￿but homogeneous in abilities relevant for wage employment.
7We use the model developed below along these lines to analyze the control theory by answering
the question how the number of wage brackets, i.e., control, a⁄ects the return to ability for
employees (vis-￿-vis entrepreneurs).
It should be emphasized that in our model the indicator for control is the strength of the
association between input (in our case ability) and the employee￿ s proceeds from output (i.e.,
in terms of wages in our case). Alternatively, one could think of how control a⁄ects the ￿rm￿ s
output. Our model does not address this question. Neither do we address control in terms of the
employee￿ s freedom to allocate e⁄ort and ability over various tasks. The decision in our model
is a binary occupational choice between employment and entrepreneurship. This choice thus
assigns individuals to a particular degree of control in terms of association between ability and
proceeds ￿not in terms of freedom to allocate time.
The equilibrium wage rate in each bracket is determined based on the mean productivity
within this bracket. This implies that an individual within the bracket may be under- or over-
compensated depending on whether his ability is below or above the mean. This is the essence of
the lack of control of return to ability, and hence to education, as a wage worker. Control increases
in the number of brackets, but for any ￿nite number of brackets it will always be lower than for
the entrepreneur who is assumed to get a one-to-one return on his human capital. Therefore, the
entrepreneur will by construction always have a higher return to education than the employee.
Our primary interest is to investigate the e⁄ect of increasing the number of brackets, implying
an increase in the control of wage employees, on the returns to ability for employees. If more
control leads to higher returns in wage employment we can induce that the control-explanation
may be a valid explanation for the higher returns to ability in entrepreneurship vis-￿-vis wage
employment.
Figure 1a shows intuitively what happens when one wage bracket (L) is subdivided into two
at the point A. The wage will tend increase for those with ability above A and decrease for those
below. It follows that the correspondence between ability and compensation increases. However,
in a general equilibrium framework there are counteracting mechanisms. A stronger correlation
between ability and wage tends to increase pro￿ts, shifting the pro￿t curve upwards, see Figure
1b. This increases the number of entrepreneurs in M and H, thereby increasing labor demand.
The net e⁄ect on the wage in the lowest of the subdivided brackets is inconclusive.
8￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ [ FIGURE 1a & 1b]￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -
Production
Individuals can choose to become either entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs hire workers,
and their own contribution is purely managerial, i.e. entrepreneurs do not enter as labor input.
Wages and pro￿ts are expressed in relation to the price of the good produced, which is normalized
to 1.
Although entrepreneurs are perfectly informed about workers￿ability, they have a limited
capability of discriminating them into di⁄erent wage brackets. More speci￿cally, they are able to
sort workers into n distinct ability brackets, where n is exogenously given. It is worth emphasizing
that n is no choice variable. Hence, it would not add anything to the analysis to assign a cost
dependent on n (which might seem natural). Moreover, n is a unique number, i.e., all ￿rms in
the economy employ exactly the same number of wage brackets in their ￿rms.
Throughout, we use j to denote brackets and the set of brackets is B = fjg
n
j=1. For simplicity,
we assume that these brackets all contain the same number of individuals, i.e., 1=n of a total
population of N belongs to each bracket j.6 Each individual i is endowed with an ability
￿i which is drawn from a distribution H(￿). Depending on the distribution H(￿), n ￿ 1 ability
levels will constitute breakpoints between di⁄erent brackets. We assume that H(￿) is continuous,
strictly increasing and everywhere di⁄erentiable. The wage is uniform within each bracket and
is in equilibrium determined by the average productivity within the bracket. Hence wages do
not perfectly re￿ ect the ability of each individual worker.
Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, earn a pro￿t that re￿ ects their actual ability. We assume
that the contribution of labor from each bracket is scaled by the average productivity in that
bracket. Hence, implicitly we are abstracting from individuals￿work-e⁄ort decisions and the
possibility of shirking. Workers within a ￿rm are assigned to one out of n di⁄erent wage brackets.
Each task is subject to decreasing returns to scale, determined by a parameter ￿ 2 [0:5;1).
Without a scale e⁄ect, all workers would be hired by the entrepreneur with the highest ability.7
6We assume n < N. As n grows large, the level of control in employment approaches the level of control in
entrepreneurship and our model breaks down.
7An alternative to the production function here is one where the total amount of labor employed is subject
to decreasing returns to scale (rather than labor in each bracket). The disadvantage of such a functional form is
that the general equilibrium properties are much less stable.
















Labor input from each bracket k is denoted by Lk. Note that given (1), we will ￿nd entrepreneurs
among the high ability individuals within each bracket. These are the individuals who lose the
most by becoming an employee and conforming to the wage rate in their bracket, and these are
also the ones with the highest pro￿t as entrepreneurs. Finally, we add a parameter ￿ 2 (0;1)
which shifts the role of the entrepreneur￿ s own ability.8
Firm￿ s decision and labor demand
The entrepreneur qua ￿rm makes a decision on how much labor to hire from each wage
bracket. The price of the good produced is normalized to 1, and the entrepreneur￿ s earnings can
therefore by described as in equation (1). Moreover, the ￿rm pays wk for each unit of labor hired


















Note that because ￿ < 1, all entrepreneurs will hire a mix of labor from all brackets in order to
minimize negative scale e⁄ects. Solving the maximization problem yields n ￿rst order conditions,








1=(1￿￿) ;8k 2 B: (3)
The higher an entrepreneur￿ s ability level, the more workers they will hire. Because 1
1￿￿ > 1, the
number of workers hired is a convex function of the entrepreneur￿ s ability level. Furthermore,











8￿ is only included for the technical purpose of facilitating the numerical solution, and plays no role for the
results.
10This ratio tells us how the hiring decision from di⁄erent wage brackets is determined by the trade-
o⁄ between the bene￿ts of higher ability levels and the costs of higher wage levels in increasing
wage brackets. To see how this depends on ￿, assume that h represents the higher wage bracket
and k the lower wage bracket, such that
￿ ￿k
￿ ￿h < 1 and wh




1￿￿. The higher is ￿, the more important will the ratio of productivity relative to
wages be in determining labor demand. This will tend to channel demand toward the high end of
the ability distribution, i.e., where ability and wages are high. Conversely, if ￿ decreases, demand
will grow stronger in the lower end of the distribution where ability, but also wages, are lower.
As we will see, through this mechanism, the level of ￿ will have important consequences for the
wage spread between di⁄erent wage bracket and thus for returns to ability in wage employment.
We will refer to the deviation from the situation that would result from ￿ = 1 as a "demand
shift" e⁄ect of ￿, shifting demand towards the lower end of the ability distribution.
Substituting the n conditions in equation (3) back into equation (2) and collecting terms




















In circumstances where the discussion does not involve ￿ ￿k and wk we will let ￿(￿i) denote
the pro￿t of individual i. The ￿rst term inside the square bracket captures the importance of
productivity relative to wages, already discussed in relation to equation (4). The second term
inside the square bracket increases in ￿ and captures the fact that as ￿ grows, entrepreneurial
earnings from each unit of labor increase. The entrepreneur￿ s own ability enters multiplicatively










This ratio shows the role of the parameter ￿ in determining the impact of the entrepreneur￿ s own
ability in pro￿ts. Assuming that ￿i > ￿j individual i will have a higher pro￿t as an entrepreneur
relative to individual j the higher is ￿. Prospective pro￿t as an entrepreneur in e⁄ect determines
the opportunity cost of wage employment. Hence, the higher is ￿, the higher is the wage of high
11ability individuals. We will refer to this as a "supply shift" e⁄ect of ￿, where the e⁄ect refers
again to the deviation from a situation with parameter value ￿ = 1. An equilibrium in this model
involves a set of n ability levels that divide each bracket into workers and entrepreneurs, and a
set of n wage levels.
Equilibrium I - Occupational choice
Individuals make an occupational choice between wage employment and entrepreneurship.
As a wage employee the individual is assigned to a wage bracket depending on her ability level.
Naturally, individuals become entrepreneurs whenever the resulting pro￿t is higher than the wage
they can earn as an employee.9 Within each ability bracket, individuals with the highest ability
levels become entrepreneurs. Thus in general, entrepreneurs may have higher or lower ability
levels than wage workers.
Following standard procedure we identify a marginal individual for whom pro￿t equals wage.
In our setting we must perforce do that for each of the n brackets. The ability of this marginal
worker/entrepreneur in bracket j will be denoted by ￿
j
￿. Individuals from the same bracket with
lower ability levels will become workers and those with higher ability levels entrepreneurs. To
keep track of the ability levels that divide the workforce into wage brackets, let ￿
j
H be the highest
and ￿
j






H = ￿H and ￿
1







H, where an equality in the ￿rst case means that e⁄ectively everyone
who would be attributed to wage bracket j as an employee will become an entrepreneur, and
an equality in the latter case that no one within this bracket will opt for entrepreneurship. The















￿;8j 2 B: (7)
If a bracket contains both entrepreneurs and wage workers, we can use the equality between
equation (5) and wage to identify the ability of the marginal worker/entrepreneur ￿
j
￿. However,









9This implies that individuals are assumed to be risk neutral and that their utility is driven by ￿nancial rewards
only.
10In practice, it will never happen that a bracket contains only entrepreneurs, since in that case, the wage would
be pushed up to extreme levels due to a lack of supply.
12To sum up, we have:
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(i) ￿
j
￿ = ￿￿1 (wj) if ￿(￿
j


















for all j 2 B. Substituting equation (7) in (5) and applying the conditions in equation (8) will






j=1 that divide the 1=n individuals per wage bracket
into groups of wage earners and entrepreneurs. Note that even if wages are exogenous, this is
a problem that involves a system of n non-linear equations which is intractable to an analytical
solution.11
Equilibrium II - Labor market
The division into wage brackets means that we will in e⁄ect have n labor markets. Labor
supply in market j is de￿ned as the number of individuals in this bracket net of entrepreneurs.














Labor demand from bracket j may come from all n brackets which makes this part a bit more
involved. Using equation (3) we can write demand for bracket j workers from bracket k entre-
















11This would still hold with another assumption about the distribution of talents (e.g. a uniform distribution
instead of the normal distribution used).





set wj = ￿(￿
j




for all j 2 B. This gives us n conditions to identify the set of equilibrium wages fwjg
n
j=1.
Altogether we have a system of 2n equations where the 2n unknowns enter each equation. This
system is solved numerically. We refer to Appendix A for a description of the iterative procedure
used to solve the model.
4 Equilibrium properties
The ability distribution
The distribution we analyze is generated from a normal distribution. Individuals are assigned
a potential ability level ^ ￿i drawn from a distribution N(￿;￿). The actual ability level is then
determined by the following equation:
￿i = ^ ￿i
￿
1 ￿ exp(￿t + ￿t
￿





This simple transformation allows for an intuitive interpretation in terms of educational institu-
tions. We can think of t as the (quality adjusted) time in school. The parameter ￿ 2 f￿1;0;1g
can be interpreted as the degree of elitism in the system. ￿ = ￿1, implies that individuals who
have a high potential (^ ￿i) bene￿t more from education. If ￿ = 0 the system will be called neutral
and with ￿ = 1 egalitarian (implying that low potential individuals gain the most from educa-
tion). An egalitarian system skews the distribution to the left whereas the elitist system skews
it to the right. The parameter ￿ is used to scale the distribution so that average productivity is
constant irrespective of the value of ￿.
12Since there exists no way to determine the market clearing wage in the hypothetical case that all individuals
belonging to a certain bracket become entrepreneurs, we will simply assume that the wage in the bracket equals
the pro￿t of the lowest ability entrepreneur within the bracket.
14Throughout we use a normal distribution of potential talents where ￿ = 1:25 and ￿ = 0:5,
together with t = 2 and ￿ = 0 in equation (11) if nothing else is indicated. Moments for
the transformed distribution are indicated with the results. Moreover, we bound the range of
potential abilities to ^ ￿i 2 [0:5;2], and choose ￿ = 0:75 and ￿ = 0:75 as the benchmark case.13
The population size N is normalized to 1.
Results
Table 1 shows the e⁄ect of increasing the number of wage bracket on some equilibrium
properties for ￿ = 0:75 and ￿ = 0:9. Both entrepreneurial and wage income tends to increase.
As the number of brackets increases, each bracket will contain less workers and thus be a⁄ected
less by decreasing returns to scale. Comparing ￿ = 0:75 with ￿ = 0:9 we see that the increase in
income is less for the higher parameter value where decreasing returns are less pronounced.
￿ ￿ -[TABLE 1]￿ ￿ ￿
Another main feature is that the share of entrepreneurs decreases as the number of brackets
increases. This is due to several e⁄ects. First, on average, the ability of highly skilled wage
employees will be less undervalued, and the average wage level increases. This will have the e⁄ect
of increasing the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship. At the same time, the entrepreneurial
pro￿ts increases due to more e¢ cient use of labor as ability and wages become more aligned.
As Table 1 reveals, the ￿rst two e⁄ects dominates the latter, resulting in a net out￿ ow of
entrepreneurs. Moreover, we note from Table 1 that a larger number of brackets increases the
general equilibrium income inequalities between wage workers and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs
have a higher income in part because they have a higher average ability level, so that even as
workers they would have a higher average income (i.e. a selection e⁄ect), and in part by virtue
of being entrepreneur.
The increased average wage level is the net e⁄ect of three drivers. The ￿rst is a demand
e⁄ect; more brackets reduce the negative e⁄ect from diminishing returns, allowing entrepreneurs
to increase their labor demand. Counteracting this e⁄ect is the above mentioned tendency of
13The parameter ￿ is added for technical purposes. By setting ￿ < 1, we will get an equilibrium with more
entrepreneurs which has more stable properties for the purposes of a numberical solution.
15a declining share of entrepreneurs. A third e⁄ect is a relatively strongly reduced supply in
the higher brackets, where wages must be pushed upwards in order for labor markets to be in
equilibrium.
Table 2 shows the main results. Using the general equilibrium outcomes we calculate the
comparative static of increasing each individual￿ s ability level (by a speci￿c number of standard
deviations of its distribution). We compute the resulting average increase in wages for several
cases that di⁄er from each other only in the presumed number of wage brackets. In our compu-
tations we include all individuals, i.e. also the ones that will enter into entrepreneurship. The
main result that we want to emphasize is that a higher level of control (i.e. more wage brackets)
tends to yield a higher increase in wages. This result is consistent with the control hypothesis:
more control leads to higher returns to ability.
￿ ￿ [TABLE 2]￿ ￿
Figure 2 plots the wage brackets and the pro￿t lines for ￿ve brackets (dotted lines) and ten
brackets (solid lines). It shows that the increased return to ability when increasing the number
of wage brackets is explained by an increase in the top wages. The lowest brackets remain
una⁄ected by increasing the number of di⁄erent tasks.
Two more results can be seen from Table 2. First, we can conjecture that the e⁄ect of control
on returns to ability is concave. Consider the case where we add 1/4 standard deviations to
ability. Going from 3 to 5 brackets (i.e. less than double) increases the returns to education with
some 20 percent, whereas the increase is about 15 percent when we go from 5 to 10 brackets (i.e.
double). We can also see that control has a larger e⁄ect when the returns to scale parameter is
low. Low returns to scale decreases the ratio of pro￿t for a high and a low skilled entrepreneur,
thus yielding more entry also in lower brackets. Entry of entrepreneurs tends to decrease supply
of labor and drive up wages. This di⁄erence can be seen from the general equilibrium for ￿ = 0:75
and ￿ = 0:5 shown in Figure 3.
￿ ￿ ￿ [FIGURE 2]￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ [FIGURE 3]￿ ￿ ￿
16In Table 3 and Table 4 we change the underlying distribution, by increasing the (mean
preserved) spread (￿) and then by giving it a right or left skew (￿). This is done to assess to
what extent the main result is dependent on or a⁄ected by distributional assumptions.
As the spread of the distribution increases, the aggregate income becomes higher, as well
as the di⁄erence in average returns for employees and entrepreneurs.14 For our purposes it
is important to note that the returns to ability is increasing in the number of brackets, for
whatever size of the variance of the underlying distribution. Moreover, from Table 3 we can also
see that the returns to ability is higher when the variation is large. This is intuitive because
wage di⁄erentials can be larger in a distribution with larger spread. Table 3 also shows that the
positive e⁄ects on returns to ability of the variance and the number of wage brackets interact:
with larger variance the e⁄ect of increasing the number of wage brackets on the returns to ability
becomes larger.
Next we give the distribution a right or a left skew. Given an invariant underlying distribution
we may interpret this as giving the population a more egalitarian or elitist treatment. We can
think of this as a school system where either the most talented or the ones with the weakest
talents are furthered the most. A more elitist system (right skew) increases aggregate income
and income inequalities in Table 4. Again, this is an e⁄ect of making the upper tail thicker and
thereby increasing the ability levels of entrepreneurs. Moreover, we see that our result that more
brackets increase the return to ability holds irrespective of the skewness. This result is stronger
in the distribution with a right skew. This is again a re￿ ection of an increased inequality in
wages as the wage structure becomes more convex.
￿ ￿ ￿ [TABLE 3]￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ -[TABLE 4]￿ ￿ ￿
14The latter e⁄ect is explained by the fact that entrepreneurs are overrepresented in the upper tail of the
distribution. More highly skilled entrepreneurs also explains why a larger spread increases aggregate income.
175 Conclusions
When asked for reasons why becoming an entrepreneur, control is frequently mentioned. Is this
more than a matter of preferences? Empirical evidence suggests that this is indeed the case:
entrepreneurs tend to have a higher return to their human capital assets than employees. A
highly intuitive explanation for this fact is that as an entrepreneur individuals are better able to
control their human capital assets and put it to use. Wage workers are constrained by assigned
tasks and work descriptions. Together with labor market rigidities this lowers the correlation
between ability and remuneration.
In this article we have explored one way of integrating the idea of di⁄erent levels of control
in a general equilibrium framework. In this model workers who are heterogenous in ability may
be assigned to the same wage bracket. In a given structure of brackets some ability levels will
be over and some undercompensated relative to their productivity. We can vary the degree of
control by varying the number of of exogenously given wage brackets.
With this model we can show that the returns to ability are higher for wage workers when
the number of brackets increase. This is consistent with the idea of limited control as the basis
for a distinction between wage workers and entrepreneurs in terms of their returns to ability.
We thus show a way of integrating the concept of control in a widely used occupational choice
model. By doing so we provide a theoretical underpinning for the control-based explanation of
the empirical observation that the returns to ability and education are higher for entrepreneurs
than for employees.
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21Appendix A
Iterative Procedure to ￿nd the equilibrium
1. Guess a wage level for each bracket.
2. Trace out breakpoints using the occupational choice condition. If no entry into entrepre-
neurship occurs in any bracket, renew guess.
3. Iterate step 4 and 5 over all brackets, beginning with the ￿rst.
4. Find new wage that equilibrates bracket j, using labor market clearing condition (leaving
out occupational choice condition). Since changing this wage will a⁄ect other brackets be-
cause the market clearing condition does not take into account the movement in breakpoints
that will occur due to the change in wages. Hence wages must be changed marginally. If
the equilibrium wage is higher than the previous wage, increase wj by some small " > 0.
If it is lower, decrease it with the same amount.
5. Trace out new breakpoints for all brackets using the occupational choice condition.
6. Test if labor markets clear with new breakpoints. Repeat until convergence.
22Figure 1: General equilibrium e⁄ects of dividing wage brackets.

































Figure 2: Wage levels and pro￿t function for n=5 (dotted lines) and n=10 (solid lines).

































Figure 3: Wage levels and pro￿t function for n=10 comparing ￿=0.75 (solid lines) with ￿=0.5
(dotted lines).
24Table 1: General equilibrium properties
￿ = 0:75 ￿ = 0:9
2 3 5 10 2 3 5 10
Agg. wage 0:687 0:759 0:855 1:012 1:045 1:088 1:145 1:226
Agg. pro￿t 0:229 0:253 0:285 0:337 0:116 0:121 0:127 0:136
Agg. income 0:916 1:012 1:140 1:349 1:161 1:209 1:272 1:362
Share entrepreneurs 0:168 0:155 0:153 0:150 0:062 0:059 0:056 0:052
Avg. wage 0:826 0:898 1:010 1:191 1:113 1:156 1:213 1:293
Avg. pro￿t 1:368 1:634 1:861 2:245 1:887 2:067 2:286 2:617
Mean 1.08, std.dev 0.32.
Table 2: Returns to ability
￿ = 0:75 ￿ = 0:9
2 3 5 10 2 3 5 10
Increase in wage
+1/4 std.dev. ability 4:47 5:82 6:98 8:05 4:72 5:78 6:52 7:14
+1/2 std.dev. ability 8:79 11:47 13:84 16:55 9:28 11:31 12:72 14:33
+1 std.dev ability 16:46 21:69 28:02 34:15 17:38 21:08 25:04 27:78
Mean 1.08, std.dev 0.32.
Table 3: Change (mean preserving) spread of distribution
￿ = 0:25 ￿ = 0:5 ￿ = 1
3 10 3 10 3 10
Agg. income 0:955 1:276 1:012 1:349 1:026 1:368
Avg.wage/Avg.pro￿t 0:588 0:590 0:549 0:531 0:552 0:532
Increase in wage
+1/4 std.dev. ability 4:56 6:06 5:82 8:05 6:29 9:05
+1/2 std.dev. ability 8:98 12:59 11:47 16:55 12:51 18:28
+1 std.dev ability 16:91 26:84 21:69 34:15 24:51 36:23
Mean1.08, std.dev0.21(￿=0.25),0.32(￿=0.5),0.36(￿=1).
Table 4: Change skewness of distribution
￿ = ￿1 ￿ = 0 ￿ = 1
3 10 3 10 3 10
Agg. income 1:024 1:365 1:012 1:349 1:002 1:340
Avg.wage/Avg.pro￿t 0:552 0:538 0:549 0:531 0:594 0:629
Increase in wage
+1/4 std.dev. ability 6:24 8:59 5:82 8:05 5:47 7:63
+1/2 std.dev. ability 12:35 17:67 11:47 16:55 10:72 24:09
+1 std.dev ability 23:48 36:37 21:69 34:15 20:11 32:02
Mean 1.07, std.dev 0.35 skew 0.08 (￿ = ￿1)
Mean 1.09, std.dev 0.30 skew -0.14 (￿ = 1)
25